24 January 2006

My appeal to the Security Commission

As I mentioned in my last post, nobody wanted to answer my key letter to the Security Commission. I thought this was an odd outcome, because I was only trying to get to the truth, and there were anomalies to indicate that some of the evidence they used to compile their report on my case simply could not be correct. There are many reasons for us to be suspicious at what went on behind the scenes, and the word malfeasance comes to mind.

The British judicial system has many factors on its side: not only does it administer the law in a way that makes it difficult to investigate exhibits impartially, but once a decision is taken the system is designed to make it even harder to reverse. The only way I can protest is to use my weak voice and make arguments on paper. Britain is a strong country, which can deploy weapons such as the ALARM missile anywhere it wishes - in the past in Iraq and the Balkans - perhaps in the future in Iran and North Korea. On the other hand, all I have at my disposal is language … my words are my weapons.

When I received no reply to my letter, I sent out a large number of copies of it to try to resolve the issues I had raised. I sent copies to Just Television (Channel 4), several journalists and a couple of dozen MPs. However, it is clear that most people simply do not understand the science involved in these arguments, and it needs the attention of an expert to see the subtle way in which information can be misleading. See whether I am asking too much, or am being unreasonable:

From: Michael John Smith
HMP Full Sutton, York

10th January 1997
Your Ref: Ke.0983/96

To: Mr J K Barron
Secretary to the Security Commission
Cabinet Office
Security Division
70 Whitehall
London SW1A 2AS

Dear Mr Barron,

Thank you very much for your letter of 20 December 1996 and for your helpful comments on the work of the Security Commission. As a consequence of your letter I am encouraged to raise some additional matters for your attention, which I have set out below.

With regard to the first paragraph of your letter, I apologise if it appeared from my letter of 21 October 1996 that I was expecting you to comment on my sentence - I can assure you that this was not the case - rather, I was merely pointing out that the length of my sentence had caused me to focus on an apparent anomaly in the Security Commission's report, concerning the RESTRICTED document, the only classified document involved in my case.

Let me say at once that, in this letter, I am not criticising the integrity or impartiality of the Security Commission. Nevertheless, I believe that the Commission's report has distorted the truth, and I presume that one or more witnesses, of those who gave evidence, have deliberately misled the Commission.

I shall raise some issues concerning the RESTRICTED document, which are related to your letter and to the Security Commission's report:

1. The Document's Classification and Apparent Sensitivity
The Security Commission's report concludes that the RESTRICTED document was 'wrongly classified’ (S.C. Report, 1.7, 5.5). This is a direct criticism of the competence of individual staff at Marconi Space & Defence Systems (Stanmore), and it also raises an issue of negligence on the part of the MoD representative, who I believe is permanently located at Marconi's Stanmore site.

Question 1: Did the Security Commission investigate the reasons given by Marconi for classifying the document at RESTRICTED?

I would have expected that the Marconi project staff were in the best technical position to assess the sensitivity of the document. A factor the Security Commission may not have considered is that the RESTRICTED document was effectively a procurement specification, to be sent to another GEC site (Hirst Research Centre), where the security regime was less rigorous.

Question 2: At the time the document was created (January 1982), did Marconi classify all documents on this project at RESTRICTED, or did they classify them according to sensitivity?

The claim that the document was wrongly classified was not an argument used by the prosecution at my trial, and this makes me suspicious that there has been some degree of duplicity by the MoD. The MoD were approached about my case even prior to my arrest, and they subsequently had over 14 months in which to produce convincing evidence that I had damaging material in my possession. If the classification of the RESTRICTED document was 'clearly wrong’ (S.C. Report, Annex A.5), then I cannot believe this was not identified before my trial. It was easy to investigate the RESTRICTED document, because Marconi's name and address appear on the front page, and the staff responsible for the project are identified. I repeat that this was the only classified document involved in my case, and it would be incredible if this document was not fully investigated before my trial.

Question 3: Did the Security Commission investigate why it took the MoD so long (August 1992 to May 1995) to decide that the RESTRICTED document was wrongly classified?

The further conclusion of the Security Commission's report is that the document should have been classified SECRET (S.C. Report, 6.2, Annex A.3 & A.4), or at least classified CONFIDENTIAL (S.C. Report, Annex A.5). I am not convinced that classification can be made retrospective - the document in my possession was marked RESTRICTED - and it is hypocritical of the MoD to move the classification "goal-posts", in order to give the impression that I had access to sensitive military secrets at GEC; this was simply not true.

To classify one small component, of a complex weapon system, as SECRET is an act which needs to be justified. Whilst I appreciate that the Security Commission's report might be an inappropriate place for this, the report relies for its accuracy on such a justification (see section 4 below for my doubts that this evidence exists). Not all information will be sensitive in a weapons system; the frequency band given in the document is not necessarily sensitive information. Take, for example, the frequency band of the Rapier surveillance radar, which was another issue in my case; this frequency band has been widely publicised and so cannot be regarded as sensitive SECRET information.

Which brings me back to the reason given in the report for the document's wrong classification: that 'at the time the document was created it was not specifically linked to a particular weapons system’ (S.C. Report, Annex A.5). I believe the truth is that the document was quite correctly classified as RESTRICTED. I say this based on what I know and not because of any bias on my part. From my own experience documents are classified more highly at first, and reduced following re-evaluation at routine reviews - not vice versa. I am further encouraged from the evidence given by prosecution witness Mr Harry Alexander Deadman at my trial, who said that documents did not need to be classified unless they referred to particular equipment.

Question 4: Subsequent to the MoD's argument about wrong classification, at what date was the RESTRICTED document raised in classification, and has it been raised to CONFIDENTIAL or SECRET?

2. The Document's History
The way the RESTRICTED document was treated in the past is a good indication of its perceived value. The document has an interesting history, which can be confirmed from documentary evidence:

8 January 1982 The document was created. The device specified in the document was part of a 'Demonstration Programme ... to be completed by June 1982’, and there would then be a 'Full Scale Project Definition and Development Programme, leading to an in-service date of 1985/86’. Also, 'It is anticipated that a second design iteration will be required in order to achieve the desired performance’ (Exhibits, p.54).

It was never revealed at my trial how many design iterations there were, or what the final specification was. I have seen no convincing evidence that this Demonstration Programme was in fact linked to ALARM at all. I have read that ALARM was barely in production at the time of the Gulf War!

Question 5: Was the Security Commission shown the evidence linking the RESTRICTED document to ALARM?

1982-84 The document was used in a BS9450 Capability Approval Exercise. A discussion was held at Hirst Research Centre on 23 May 1983, which clearly shows that the device specified in the RESTRICTED document was used in the Exercise, and it was identified as CQC-SAW 5 (Exhibits, pp.116-8). Material from the document was copied and supplied to the British Standards Institute (Exhibits, pp.161-70), and this information would have been further distributed to those involved in the Capability Approval Exercise.

28 February 1984 GEC were approved to manufacture the device to BS9450 standard, as recorded in an 'Abstract for inclusion in PD 9002’ (Exhibits, p.103-4). Apparently the same device was either already being manufactured commercially by GEC Semiconductors at Lincoln, or it became a new commercial product about this time, identified as type number DW9210 (GEC Semiconductors Products Catalogue).

2 December 1985 I joined HRC and took possession of the document. It is completely untrue to allege that it was a document which it 'appears he had stolen from the filing cabinet of a former colleague in his room’ (S.C. Report, 5.5); no evidence was given at my trial to support such a claim. The document was amongst a considerable amount of paperwork I found in the desk I inherited from a Mr D.T. Lewis, and I worked with Mr Lewis for about 3 weeks prior to his retirement from HRC, at Christmas 1985.

It is true that an allegation was made at my trial that I had stolen another non-military document - unconnected with the RESTRICTED document - from a colleague named Bill Tatham (Judge's Summing-up Volume I, p.103, pp.116-7; Volume II, p.46). However, the evidence for this was weak, and there was stronger documentary evidence to support the truth, which was that he had given me this document for work which we were jointly engaged upon.

Question 6: What evidence was presented to the Security Commission, that I had stolen the RESTRICTED document 'from the filing cabinet of a former colleague in [my] room’ ?

31 July 1992 I left GEC, and on the same day I removed the RESTRICTED document and some other material from GEC.

6 August 1992 The first reference I have that the MoD were involved in my case is a statement by a Mr Alan Rennie (Witness Statement, p.184).

8 August 1992 I was arrested. I raised the issue of the RESTRICTED document myself, on 10 August 1992, during my police interviews (Interviews, pp.373-5).

3 November 1992 Dr Meirion Francis Lewis was definitely aware of the document by this date, because he mentioned that he had seen it (Witness Statement, pp.113-4).

June 1993 My technical expert, Dr Eamonn Francis Maher, issued a report which dismissed the importance of the RESTRICTED document. Dr Maher referred to the device specified in the document as 'a *** MHz Device - MEDL number not revealed in the exhibit but probably DW9210’ (Maher Report, p.24). In describing the document's contents he said: 'The information that is not in the public domain and may be of military significance is in relation to the *** MHz SAW device being used in an airborne guided weapon (page 53 of the exhibit bundle). This is not of use without details of the weapon system itself and as Mr Senior [a defence expert] states it would appear that both the *** MHz device and the 200 MHz device are, or were, commercially available in any event’ (Maher Report, p.26).

23 July 1993 Dr M.F. Lewis had read Dr Maher's report by this date, but he did not specifically refer to the RESTRICTED document (Witness Statement, pp.313-4). Although Dr Lewis had a perfect opportunity of rejecting Dr Maher's conclusions, he did not do so. Since Dr Lewis was the only witness likely to comment on this document, the prosecution had still not identified the system in which the device was used, almost a year after my arrest.

7 & 11 October 1993 Dr Lewis said in court that the document was linked to ALARM and that it would enable an enemy to jam the missile. Dr Lewis claimed that his evidence was supported by "hearsay" evidence he had received from a man (alleged to be Marconi's Technical Director) in a telephone conversation on the morning of 11 October 1993, before he gave his final evidence. I wrote to Marconi on 21 November 1995, and they refused to acknowledge that Dr Lewis had spoken to their Technical Director on 11 October 1993; this reluctance to confirm such basic information is further evidence of the suspicious circumstances surrounding this issue, and calls into question what dialogue there had been between the MoD and Marconi about the RESTRICTED document.

Question 7: Was the Security Commission given information about communications, prior to my trial, between the MoD, prosecution and Marconi to determine what breaches of security might have occurred - and what significance was the RESTRICTED document given at that stage?
(This is very relevant to the reasons why the claims about wrong classification were not produced at my trial).

3. Interference Between the Security Commission Inquiry and My Appeal
The Security Commission's report states that 'certain further matters have come to light as a result of Smith’s appeal. In particular, it has emerged that some of the material supplied by MoD on which we based our damage assessment, was seriously incorrect’ (S.C. Report, 1.7). Later in the report, it is stated that 'In May 1995, in the course of preparing for Smith’s appeal, a discrepancy between the damage assessment report dated 8 March 1994 and the case presented on behalf of the Crown at Smith’s trial became apparent’ (S.C. Report, Annex A.3).

Question 8: At what date was this discrepancy first noticed?

I am confused about how the discrepancy 'became apparent’, because I had no specific grounds on scientific evidence which would have raised the RESTRICTED document as an issue at my appeal. From your letter, I am also concerned about the role of The Solicitor General, Sir Derek Spencer, who was not listed in your report as a witness.

Question 9: What were the circumstances under which Sir Derek Spencer came to see a copy of the MoD damage assessment report prior to my appeal in May 1995?

In your letter, you appear to believe that the issues surrounding the changes in the MoD damage assessment report were 'covered fully’ at my appeal hearing; this was not so. The MoD stated their position, but the facts behind the RESTRICTED document were not aired to my satisfaction. There is a technical issue to be resolved, concerning specifications and operational modes, and whether the RESTRICTED document would facilitate jamming. The original MoD report was moderate: 'no serious damage’, etc (in accord with my own comments during my police interviews), and I believe that this was far nearer to reality than the revised MoD report. No justification has been produced, by a recognised expert in ALARM, that "serious damage" could be caused by the contents of the RESTRICTED document.

Whether the effect was beneficial or not, it cannot be denied that a certain amount of cross-fertilisation has occurred between the Security Commission's inquiry and my appeal. This caused an interference in both directions:

(a) the Solicitor General was able to affect your inquiry with material from my trial.

(b) the MoD report dated 7 March 1994, and the amendment dated 16 May 1995, had a significant effect on the course of my appeal.

Question 10: Was the damage assessment report requested from the MoD with the intention that the information would be shared with the prosecution?

The Original MoD report was not shown to the defence until my appeal had started on 15 May 1995, and on the 16 May 1995 Mr MacCulloch's amendment was given to the defence. This caused considerable difficulties for my defence, and led to the adjournment of my appeal.

With all due respect, I cannot agree with the assertion in your letter, that 'the inquiry was completely separate to any criminal proceedings’.

4. The Document's Contents - Accuracy of Evidence
The Security Commission's report suggests that evidence was given at my trial that the RESTRICTED document 'was potentially of great value to an intelligent enemy in connection with one of the UK’s current weapons system’ (S.C. Report, Annex A.3). I would challenge the accuracy of the evidence given at my trial on this issue. It was only Dr M.F. Lewis and Dr D.I. Weatherley who said anything notable about the RESTRICTED document at my trial, and they made no claims to be experts in the details of ALARM or jamming.

Dr Lewis gave the most significant technical evidence on which the jury were invited to convict me. However, Dr Lewis was called as an expert on SAW (surface acoustic wave) technology, not on ALARM, and he stated from the witness box that he was not an expert in missile technology nor in jamming.

Dr Weatherley gave only an administrator's view of the RESTRICTED document; he never claimed that it was used in ALARM, or that it would enable ALARM to be jammed. It was Dr Weatherley who stopped the cross-examination of Dr Lewis when he started to reveal relevant information about the usefulness of the RESTRICTED document. Dr Weatherley's lack of expertise in airborne weaponry was identified by the judge at my trial, when he said: '[Dr Weatherley] had general scientific expertise. He had no precise detailed expertise about any one of them [the individual scientific subjects in my case]; that is not his job. His job ... was scientific adviser to the MoD for all matters relating to land warfare’ (Judge's Summing-up Volume I, pp.88-9).

A serious weakness of the Security Commission's inquiry is that Mr MacCulloch's amendment (dated 16 May 1995) was heavily influenced by Dr Lewis and Dr Weatherley. No evidence for the MoD's views, about the sensitive nature of the RESTRICTED document, has been presented, as far as I am aware. I would also draw your attention to the fact that no experts from the ALARM project were used by the prosecution at my trial.

Question 11: Was technical evidence, apart from Dr Lewis, presented to the Security Commission to support the MoD's claim that "serious damage" could have been caused by the RESTRICTED document?

Whatever the Solicitor General thought, when he saw Mr MacCulloch's original report, he would have known that Dr Lewis had not claimed any expertise in missiles or jamming. Rather than believing what was said at my trial by a non-expert, I would have expected that the MoD report would have set alarm bells ringing in the Solicitor General's head. But it was quite clear from my trial, that the Solicitor General believed published and widely available material was sensitive (which was the line he pursued in court); therefore, I would suggest, he is not the best judge of what is sensitive.

Since my appeal, I have investigated Dr Lewis's evidence myself, and I have concluded that it cannot be correct; much of Dr Lewis's evidence is quite erroneous and exaggerated, and he could not have deduced that ALARM was identifiable from the RESTRICTED document alone. I can now confidently accuse Dr Lewis of giving misleading evidence, and I can only assume that Dr Lewis has mistakenly done so to support the MoD's case, possibly with the prosecution's knowledge. If Dr Lewis did not get his evidence from his own experience, then it is uncertain where it did come from - because it seems that the accuracy of the Security Commission's report is based upon his evidence.

Question 12: Is it within the Security Commission's remit to request an independent analysis (by a non-MoD expert) of the evidence presented to the Security Commission about the RESTRICTED document?

Towards the end of your letter you state that the Security Commission report 'needed to reflect accurately all the events surrounding your case’. With what I have stated above, and with all due respect to the members of the Commission, I cannot agree with you on the issue of the RESTRICTED document. I know, from my own experience of the technical issues, that some key evidence has been withheld; not, I surmise, by the members of the Security Commission itself, but by those who gave evidence to the Commission.

I am aware that the Security Commission could have been persuaded that material was sensitive, because scientific arguments are not understandable to non-experts. Due to the circumstances of my trial and appeal, I was seriously disadvantaged by not having access to an expert who could challenge the evidence of Dr Lewis at the time. I anticipate that the Security Commission have been similarly misled about the RESTRICTED document.

In conclusion, I am of the firm opinion that the details in the Security Commission's report, about the classification and sensitivity of the RESTRICTED document, are not accurate, and will be proved to be so in the course of time. I should also point out, that I am aware of a number of other serious errors in the Security Commission's report, although they are not related to the issue of the RESTRICTED document.

I apologise that this letter has necessarily become a little lengthy, although you will appreciate that I have only summarized the issues, and I could go into much greater detail if it is required. I look forward to receiving your reply on the matters which I have raised, and I would be grateful if you can particularly address the questions which I have numbered.

Yours sincerely,
Michael Smith

Early correspondence with Security Commission

As stated in my last post, the Security Commission found it impossible to answer questions arising from their investigation of my case. Moreover, in my earlier correspondence with them, they gave very little away that might help me discover the truth. I print below 3 relevant letters:

From: The Cabinet Office
Security Division
70 Whitehall
London SW1A 2AS

17 July 1995
Ke.0456

To: M J Smith
Full Sutton Prison, York

Dear Mr Smith,

As you may know, the Prime Minister asked the Security Commission in January 1994:

"To investigate the circumstances in which breaches of security have or may have occurred arising out of the case of Michael John Smith, who was convicted on 18 November 1993 of offences under Section 1 of the Official Secrets Act 1911; and to advise in the light of that investigation whether any change in security arrangements is necessary or desirable."

The Security Commission is an independent body. The members who took part in the investigation were:

The Rt Hon the Lord Lloyd of Berwick (Chairman)
Sir John Blelloch KCB
Lt Gen Sir Derek Boorman KCB
Lord Tombs of Brailes

This is the fourteenth case which the Security Commission has considered since it was set up by the then Prime Minister, Sir Alex Douglas-Home, in January 1964.

The purpose of the Security Commission's investigation was to consider the wider lessons which could be learned from your case and to make recommendations to the Government about changes it should make to improve security. The investigation ranged wider than those matters which were the subject of your trial, and covered your employment at both EMI and GEC. I would emphasise, though, that the aim of the investigation was not to re-try you, but to focus on those changes that the Government should make to improve security. The Security Commission has made nine recommendations to the Government, most of which concern the way in which the MOD and the Security Service operate. Following your appeal, the Security Commission made some minor changes to its report and submitted it to the Prime Minister.

You may wish to know that the Prime Minister will publish the report on Wednesday 19 July by way of a written Parliamentary Question. This is likely to lead to some publicity.

Yours sincerely,
J.K. Barron
Secretary to the Security Commission






Security Commission letter 17 July 1995 page 1





Security Commission letter 17 July 1995 page 2


Following a long period of study, both of the Security Commission’s report, and of the details it referred to in my trial, I decided it was necessary for me to pursue matters further, and I wrote a letter to the Commission:

From: Michael John Smith
HMP Full Sutton, York

21st October 1996
Your Ref: Ke.0456

To: Mr J K Barron
Secretary to the Security Commission
Security Division
Cabinet Office
70 Whitehall
London SW1A 2AS

Dear Mr Barron,

I have read several times the findings of the Security Commission report upon my case, published in July 1995, and I am puzzled by the assertion made at Annex A, paragraph 5:

'at the time the document was created it was not specifically linked to a particular weapons system.’

Such information is very relevant as during my trial it was confirmed that this document, the only RESTRICTED document involved in my case, was created in January 1982, that is almost 4 years before I worked for GEC or had any link whatsoever with that company. The fact is that I had no access to the document in question prior to December 1985, when I joined GEC, as it was contained in the desk I inherited from my predecessor. Consequently, I could not have been aware of the document's history, nor its original or final application, and even less likely was it that I would have stolen it with spying intentions.

In your letter to me of 17 July 1995 you affirmed that, following my appeal, 'the Security Commission made some minor changes to its report’. These changes have led me to realise that, while in the original report the so-called RESTRICTED document, found in my possession in August 1992, was considered irrelevant (of no prime significance) for the case brought against me, in the latter it is explained that such irrelevance was only at the beginning, when the document was created, by affirming indirectly that it would have been used afterwards in connection with 'a particular weapons system’.

If the use of the document had changed at some point, sometime during more than a 10 year period, I fail to see how I could possibly have known that fact, especially as I have never been connected with any work involving this RESTRICTED document. Therefore, I would be very grateful if you can give me some more explanation in that respect, as I am actually serving a heavy sentence for something which seems to me to be an extreme case of over-reaction.

I thank you in anticipation for your prompt attention and kind reply to this letter.

Yours sincerely,
Michael John Smith

When the Security Commission’s reply came it did really help me at all:

From: The Cabinet Office
Security Division
70 Whitehall
London SW1A 2AS

20 December 1996
Ke.0983/96

To: M J Smith
HMP Full SuttonYork

Dear Mr Smith,

I am writing further to my letter to you of 30 October. You will appreciate that I can only comment in respect of the way in which this matter was dealt with in the Security Commission report and that it would not be appropriate for me to make any comment in relation to the sentence passed on you, which was subsequently reduced on appeal.

It may be helpful if I set out the background to the work of the Security Commission and its remit. The Commission was established in 1964 with the following terms of reference as announced on 23 January 1964 by the Prime Minister (Sir Alec Douglas-Home):

"If so requested by the Prime Minister to investigate and report upon the circumstances in which a breach of security is known to have occurred in the public service, and upon any related failure of departmental security arrangements or neglect of duty; and, in the light of any such investigation, to advise whether any change in security arrangements is necessary or desirable." (Hansard cols 1271-3).

As you are aware, the Prime Minister invited the Security Commission to consider the factors surrounding your conviction in November 1993 for offences under the Official Secrets Act. In line with the Commission's terms of reference, the purpose of the inquiry was solely to examine any breaches of security that came to light following your conviction and to advise whether any change in security arrangements was required. The inquiry was completely separate to any criminal proceedings.

With regard to the particular paper you mention, you will recall that prior to the appeal hearing in May 1995, the Solicitor General saw a copy of the damage assessment which had been prepared by the Ministry of Defence for the purpose of the Security Commission inquiry (referring to the document cited in your letter). He found this to be at variance with the evidence previously given at the original trial by the witnesses for the Crown. Once this error had been realised, the MoD then prepared a revised damage assessment which was provided to the Defence Counsel and to the Security Commission. I understand that these events were covered fully at the appeal hearing.

The report by the Security Commission was not published until after the appeal hearing had been concluded: as a report to the Prime Minister it needed to reflect accurately all the events surrounding your case, including the fact that the original damage assessment provided to the Commission by the MoD was subsequently revised.

The Chairman of the Security Commission has seen and approved this reply.
J K Barron



Security Commission letter 20 December 1996 page 1



Security Commission letter 20 December 1996 page 2

This was clearly not the end of the affair, but my next step seemed to baffle the Security Commission, and stop it dead in its tracks.